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REPLACEMENT BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
**** 
 
 JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in the case involving Michael 
Rowan pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(i) as an appeal 
from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony. 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in the case involving Rebecca 
George pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code §78A-3-102(3)(b) as a case 
certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by 
the Court of Appeals. The Court consolidated the cases on November 20, 2015 
after a stipulated motion by the parties.1 
                                                
1 The trial court prepared a record for each defendant on appeal. Many of the 
pleadings are contained in each record. However, there are some documents only 
found in Rowan’s record. To the extent that some of the relevant documents are 
not contained in one record or another, defendants do not claim the State has 
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 ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
 1. Whether the trial court erred when it found the warrant affidavit did not 
support probable cause.  This Court will “review a district court’s assessment of a 
magistrate’s probable cause determination for correctness and ask whether the 
district court erred in concluding that the magistrate did not have a substantial 
basis for his or her probable cause determination.” State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, 
¶12, 267 P.3d 210.2 The Court will review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny 
a motion to suppress based on an illegal search as a mixed question of law and 
fact. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶17, 332 P.3d 937. “We review the factual 
findings underlying a grant of a motion to suppress evidence under a ‘clearly 
erroneous’ standard, and review the trial court’s conclusions of law based thereon 
for correctness.” State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah App 1993) (citing State 
v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992)). 
                                                                                                                                                       
failed to preserve or provide an adequate record. The cases have been 
consolidated on appeal and defendants will treat the records as though they are 
one combined record. To be consistent with the State’s brief, citations to the 
electronic record from Michael Rowan’s case will be designated by the letter “R”, 
and citations to the electronic record from Rebecca George’s case will be 
designated by the letter “G”. 
2 Defendants contend that the “substantial basis” standard of review can be 
attributed to the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of Fourth 
Amendment cases. See State v. Norris, 2001 UT ¶14, 48 P.3d 872 (the line of 
cases leads to Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 
(1983)). Because this case is being raised under the Utah Constitution, and 
because this Court has not yet disclosed the Utah standard of review involved in a 
district court’s assessment of a magistrate’s probable cause determination in 
issuing a warrant, Defendants suggest this Court should apply the simple 
standard of review applied in similar circumstances: the factual questions 
reviewed for clear error; and the existence of probable cause reviewed for 
correctness. An argument supporting the use of this standard will be made below. 
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The question of probable cause was preserved, to the extent it was 
preserved, by the “State’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress”. R.041-
53. In its pleadings to the trial court, the State preserved four arguments: (1) the 
“CI” demonstrated sufficient credibility to support the warrant (R.044-47); (2) 
probable cause supported the search of “All Persons, All Residence” (R.047-48); 
and (3) the officer corroborated the “CI” information (R.048-49). At oral 
argument, the State submitted the initial question of probable cause “on the 
documentation.” R.266. Any other probable cause arguments were not preserved 
by the State. 
 2. Whether this Court should reverse its prior holdings that article I, 
section 14, of the Utah Constitution requires exclusion of evidence obtained from 
illegal searches and seizures. The State’s suggestion, that the existence of a state 
exclusionary rule is merely a matter of constitutional interpretation reviewed for 
correctness, is only half right. State’s Brief at 3. In reality, this Court is not only 
interpreting the Utah Constitution, it is deciding whether its current precedent 
regarding the Utah Constitution should be abandoned. In this circumstance the 
Court reviews challenges to its former interpretations of the Utah Constitution in 
light of the doctrine of stare decisis, and it will not overrule its precedents lightly. 
State v. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶33. Although courts of last resort are not bound to 
mechanically apply stare decisis, the “presumption against overruling” precedent 
can be quite weighty. Guard, 2015 UT 96, ¶33 (citing Eldridge v. Johndrow, 
2015 UT 21, ¶22, 345 P.3d 553).  
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 The State preserved this issue in its Response to Address Good Faith 
Exception Under Utah Constitution, where it argued the trial court should 
“abandon the precedent regarding the exclusionary rule under article I, section 
14, of the Utah Constitution” because the precedent lacked “proper scrutiny”. 
R.102. The State preserved the arguments that the Utah exclusionary rule is not 
supported by the text of section 14, the history of the constitutional convention 
does not support exclusion, section 14 is not self-executing, and exclusion 
constitutes bad public policy. R.104-10. 
 3. Whether this Court should create an as-yet unrecognized good faith 
exception to Utah’s exclusionary rule. The question of whether Utah’s 
exclusionary rule is subject to a good faith exception has not been decided by this 
Court. See State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420 (“We leave for another day the 
issue of whether to apply in appropriate circumstances a good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule of article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.”). The trial 
court declined to create a good faith exception and this Court should review 
whether to create an exception for correctness. 
 The argument for a good faith exception was preserved by the State in its 
Response to Address Good Faith Exception Under Utah Constitution where it 
argued the trial court should apply the interstitial model of constitutional 
analysis, thereby foregoing any analysis of whether any independent good faith 
exception applies to Utah’s Constitution. R.112-28. The State also argued a good 
faith exception should apply to Utah’s Constitution because Utah’s exclusionary 
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rule, like the federal rule, “is a judicial remedy designed to deter future 
constitutional violations by law enforcement” and “not a constitutional 
requirement.” R.131. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in full in the Addenda.    
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
 The State of Utah appeals from the final order of the district court 
dismissing the charges following the suppression of evidence that substantially 
impaired the State’s ability to proceed to trial. The trial court ruled that the police 
illegally obtained evidence during an unlawful search of the defendants’ home.  
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
 Michael Rowan (Rowan) was charged with (1) Distribution of or Arranging 
to Distribute a Controlled Substance (marijuana) in a Drug Free Zone; a second 
degree felony; (2) Possession of a Controlled Substance (marijuana) with Intent 
to Distribute with Prior Conviction in a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony; (3) 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (psilocybin) with Prior Conviction in 
a Drug Free Zone, a first degree felony; (4) Possession or Use of a Firearm by 
Restricted Person, a third degree felony, and (5) Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a class A misdemeanor. R.001-02. Both 
Rowan and Rebecca George (George) were charged with (6) Endangerment of a 
Child or Vulnerable Adult, a third degree felony. R.002, G.002. 
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Defendants moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search of their 
home, arguing that the warrant was not supported by probable cause under both 
the state and federal constitutions. R.027-37. The State opposed the motion. 
R.263-68; G.104. After argument, the trial court denied the motion, concluding 
that although the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the evidence 
should not be suppressed because of the federal good faith exception articulated 
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). R.226-32, 269-81; G.84-78, 105.  
Defendants subsequently supplemented their argument and asked the trial court 
for a ruling on the question of the good faith exception under the Utah 
constitution. R.070-80. In response, the State argued that there is no basis for an 
exclusionary rule under the Utah Constitution and, even if there were, it should 
include a good faith exception analogous to the federal Leon exception. R.088-
146. The trial court heard additional argument and then granted the Defendants’ 
motion to suppress, declining to overrule the state exclusionary rule, and 
declining to recognize a good faith exception. R.180-94, 282-90; G.051-37. 
On the State’s motion, the trial court dismissed the charges against 
Defendants on the ground that suppression of evidence substantially impaired 
the State’s cases. R.241, 247; G.092, 098.  
 The State timely appealed both cases. R.251-52; G.101-100. After this Court 
elected to retain the Rowan case on its docket, the court of appeals certified the 
George case for transfer to this Court and the cases were consolidated. R.306. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS3 
1. “On August 28, 2012, a district court judge authorized a search warrant for a 
residence located at [address deleted] in Provo, Utah.” R.227. 
2. “The warrant issued based on the supporting affidavit of Officer Steven O. Pratt 
of the Springville Police Department.” R.227 
3. “Law enforcement officers executed the warrant on the same day it issued.” 
R.227. 
4. “The information supporting the warrant came primarily from a confidential 
informant. (“the Confidential Informant”).” R.227. 
5. “The Confidential Informant was cooperating with the police in exchange for 
leniency on pending charges.” R.227, 062. 
6. “The Confidential Informant told police that a person named Mike was in 
possession of marijuana and would sell it to the Confidential Informant.” 
R.227, 272. 
7. “The Confidential Informant stated that he had been in Mike’s home in the 
past, but did not say when.” R.227, 272. 
8. “The Confidential Informant stated that he had purchased drugs from Mike. 
                                                
3 Defendants take this Statement of Relevant Facts verbatim from the trial court’s 
“Findings of Fact” within its ruling on the motion to suppress, most of which 
refer to the transcript of a hearing at which the court made oral findings. R.227-
30. 
Because the State has not alleged any errors in the trial court’s factual findings, 
and neither do Defendants, the trial court’s written findings of facts are 
definitive. To the extent the State has taken away from, or added to, the trial 
court’s written findings of fact, without making a challenge thereto, this Court 
should ignore the State’s factual recitation. 
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(Transcript, p.2, lines 15-16).” R.227, 272. 
9. “The Confidential Informant further stated that (1) Mike sells marijuana in 
bulk; (2) Mike’s product is vacuum-sealed; (3) Mike travels to California to 
obtain marijuana to sell in Utah; (4) Mike keeps his marijuana in a residence 
located at [address deleted] in Provo; (6) Mike is a martial arts master and is 
very familiar with the art of combat; (7) the Confidential Informant has heard 
Mike speak of firearms in the past, but did not say when; and (8) the 
Confidential Informant believed there may be a firearm in Mike’s residence, 
but offered no facts to substantiate this belief.” R.227-28, 272-73. 
10. “The information provided by the Confidential Informant to police purported 
to be based in the Confidential Informant’s personal knowledge.” R.228, 273. 
11. “The police tried to identify Mike by checking records on the residence, vehicle 
registrations, and other police records, but were ultimately unsuccessful in 
corroborating any of the information that the Confidential Informant 
provided.” R.228, 273. 
12. “The police did not attempt to corroborate independently any of the other 
information provided by the Confidential Informant.”4 R.228, 273. 
                                                
4 The following was attached as a footnote to the trial court’s finding number 12. 
“The failure of the police to corroborate any of the Informant’s information and 
failure to ‘control’ the buy in which the Informant participated stand in stark 
contrast to representations in the Affidavit. There, the affiant swears that ‘the 
[Informant] has provided creditable information and has not said anything that 
would prove false or misleading. The information the [Informant] has given has 
been investigated and proved credible.” (Affidavit, ¶4). The only measure police 
took to corroborate the Informant’s claims was to conduct a buy which they failed 
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13. “Instead, the police arranged for what was intended to be a “controlled” buy, 
although the controls were at best slipshod.” R.228, 273. 
14. “The police searched the Confidential Informant’s person and found no 
controlled substances.” R.228, 273. 
15. “The Confidential Informant then made a call to a person the Confidential 
Informant identified as Mike. Police monitored the call.” R.228, 273. 
16. “The Confidential Informant agreed to purchase a certain amount of marijuana 
for a certain amount of money from the person who was on the phone.” R.229, 
273. 
17. “The sale would take place at the [address deleted] address in Provo.” R.229, 
27. 
18. “Police issued buy money to the Confidential Informant.” R.229, 273. 
19. “For reasons that remain puzzling, police then allowed the Confidential 
Informant—a known user of controlled substances whose cooperation with 
police was given in exchange for leniency on pending charges—to get back into 
his own vehicle and drive to the residence at [address deleted] in Provo.” 
R.229, 273-74, 062. 
20. “Police did not search the vehicle for controlled substances before the 
Confidential Informant drove to the residence.” R.229, 274. 
21. “The Confidential Informant went into the house. A short time later, police 
                                                                                                                                                       
to control. Other investigation yielded no information. At best, these 
representations in the Affidavit are conclusory, at worst misleading.” R.228. 
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observed the Confidential Informant exit the residence.” R.229, 274, 062]. 
22. “Again, the Confidential Informant was allowed to drive his own vehicle from 
the residence to a predetermined location where he met the police.” R.229, 
062. 
23. “Police searched the Confidential Informant’s person and discovered a 
controlled substance. The buy money was not discovered on the Confidential 
Informant’s person.” R.229, 274, 062. 
24. “Police did not search the Confidential Informant’s vehicle after the buy.” 
R.230, 274. 
  In addition to the facts specifically noted in the trial court’s findings, the 
affidavit in support of the warrant also contained the following relevant 
information: 
  The affiant met the Confidential Informant within “the past 72 hours” of 
requesting the warrant. R.062. Although the Confidential Informant claimed “Mike 
keeps marijuana inside his residence”, the Confidential Informant admitted he did 
not know where it was kept. R.062.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the warrant was not supported 
by probable cause because the affidavit relied upon conclusory statements, 
unspecific and unverified information, and a ‘controlled’ buy which was anything 
but controlled. The police had no reason to believe the drugs found on the 
Confidential Informant did not come from his car which they neglected to search. 
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Even under the substantial basis standard the trial court would have been correct 
in concluding that the magistrate’s decision was erroneous because the affidavit 
did not demonstrate a substantial basis to believe evidence of illegal conduct 
would be found in the defendants’ home. Under the traditional, mixed standard 
of review, the trial court correctly concluded the warrant was not supported by 
probable cause. 
 In the alternative, this Court could affirm because the trial court could have 
concluded the warrant was improper because the police omitted crucial 
information that misled the magistrate on issues critical to the determination of 
the informant’s credibility. The officer’s alleged that the Confidential Informant 
was reliable based on his record of not providing false or misleading information 
in the past, but the officer neglected to admit that the informant had never 
provided them any information before, true or false. That omission misled the 
magistrate into crediting the Confidential Informant as a reliable proven source 
rather than an unproven criminal looking to gain favor in his own case. Because 
the officer provided misleading information in the affidavit, this Court could 
strike the misleading information and conclude the affidavit was wholly 
inadequate to support the issuance of a search warrant. 
 2. This Court should not overrule the Utah cases that recognize the 
exclusionary rule in Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution. The existence 
of a state exclusionary rule is supported by the text of the Utah Constitution, by 
the intent of the framers, and by the historical context and cases at the time of 
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ratification. This Court should reaffirm its precedent that violations of Article I, 
Section 14, are subject to exclusion as a constitutionally required remedy, not 
merely a judicial tool for deterrence.  
 3. This Court should not recognize a good faith exception to Utah’s 
exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is not merely a judicially crafted remedy 
to deter police misconduct, it is the natural manifestation of the “right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects”. Exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is the essence of the right. Exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence puts the people back into the state which existed prior to the 
violation, it reestablishes a person’s security guaranteed by the language of the 
constitution. A good faith exception undermines these purposes. A good faith 
exception undermines the warrant issuing process by diminishing the incentive 
the police have to actually establish probable cause and insulating the reviewing 
judges from any scrutiny. A good faith exception obliterates the fundamental 
constitutional requirement that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE WARRANT WAS ISSUED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE AND 
WITHOUT A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS TO FIND PROBABLE CAUSE 
A. Relevant Standard of Review 
 The standard of review may be of interest to this Court as it considers how 
to interpret the Utah Constitution and how cases like this one, where a warrant 
was issued and then later invalidated after a motion to suppress. The State’s Brief 
cites Norris, 2001 UT 104 for the proposition that reviewing courts “afford[] 
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great deference to the magistrate’s decision to issue a search warrant.” State’s 
Brief at 3. The State goes on to cite the United States Supreme Court in support of 
its claim that this Court will not examine de novo whether or not probable cause 
existed, but only whether the magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that 
probable cause existed. State’s Brief at 3 (quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 
U.S. 727, 728, 104 S.C.t 2085, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984)). 
“The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a civil 
right.” Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355 (Utah 1941) (J. Wolfe concurring). So too 
would be the right to be protected from a search warrants issued without 
probable cause. The problem with the standard of review proposed by the State, 
and imposed by the federal case law, is that is destroys the probable cause 
standard, thereby diminishing individual civil rights. The plain language of the 
right is that warrants “shall not issue but upon probable cause.” The obvious 
meaning of that language is that we have the right not to have a magistrate issue 
a warrant to search or seize us or our property without probable cause. 
In reality, the standard of review applied under the federal constitution 
adds an asterisk to the Fourth Amendment, and in a small font in a footnote the 
federal constitution now says “Warrants may actually issue without probable cause 
so long as the magistrate has a substantial basis to conclude probable cause may exist, 
regardless of whether or not probable cause actually does exist.” How this standard 
can be said to protect one of our most inviolate and sacred rights is a mystery. 
Probable cause is probable cause. Halfway, or ¾ of the way to probable cause 
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may be a substantial basis, but it is not probable cause. Any standard that would 
uphold the issuance of a warrant without requiring 100 percent of probable cause 
should give pause to a court seeking to follow the text of the constitution. 
Instead of applying the substantial basis standard, as the federal courts 
have applied to the Fourth Amendment, Defendants urge this Court, as it takes 
the opportunity to consider the section 14, to apply a standard of review that 
adequately accounts for the significance and simplicity of the right the 
government has allegedly violated. After all, if the same constitutional right is 
afforded a non-deferential correctness review when a search occurs without a 
warrant5 (i.e. Did probable cause exist when the police searched an automobile 
on the side of the road?), why should the existence of an invalid warrant 
undermine or diminish a person’s right to be free from government interference 
with a less demanding standard (i.e. Even though no probable cause existed, did 
the magistrate have a substantial basis to find probable cause to issue the 
warrant?)? The obvious answer, the answer that strictly interprets the language 
of the constitution is that the existence of a warrant shouldn’t undermine or 
diminish the probable cause standard. Probable cause is probable cause, whether 
this Court is reviewing a district court’s finding of probable cause for an 
automobile search or a magistrate’s finding of probable cause in the issuance of a 
                                                
5 See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶15, 103 P.3d 699 (Utah 2004) (this Court 
abandoned “the standard which extended ‘some deference’ to the application of 
law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure cases in favor of non-
deferential review.”). 
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warrant, the right is the same and probable cause is the same, so too should be 
the standard of review. 
However, the State in its brief and the federal case law support the 
distinction between the standard in warrant and non-warrant cases. The State 
argues that this Court “may not invalidate the warrant simply because it might 
have reached a different result”. State’s Brief at 14. In other words, according to 
the State, this Court may not invalidate a warrant even if it was not supported by 
probable cause. According to this federal precedent, this Court’s ability to review 
a challenged search or seizure based on a warrant is distinct (and constrained) as 
compared to its ability and practice to review a search or seizure made without a 
warrant. 
Applying this rule, imagine the police are investigating the activity at two 
adjoining houses and collect the same amount of evidence in support of their 
intended search for each house, evidence which does not reach the level of 
probable cause, and the police obtain a warrant in one instance and decline to 
request a warrant in the other. The house without the warrant is entitled to the 
full protection of the probable cause standard, the search of this home would be 
illegal. But the house with the warrant is denied the protection of the probable 
cause standard, and some unclear metric, something less than probable cause, 
may be found to justify the search. 
 According to the State, this distinction is appropriate because “the 
resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined 
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by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” State’s Brief at 14 (quoting United 
States v. Vantresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684). In other 
words, because we like warrants and we want to encourage the police to seek 
warrants, if it is a close case where we are not sure whether probable cause 
existed but a warrant was obtained, courts are going to uphold the search, 
regardless of the actual existence of probable cause. Apparently for the State, tie 
goes to the warrant, as opposed to the constitution.  
But this problematic reasoning actually goes further than that. The federal 
courts, in an effort to encourage the police to request a warrant, have decided to 
reduce the amount of evidence needed to support a warrant if the officers are 
willing to go to the trouble of requesting it. Vantresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (“this 
Court, strongly supporting the preference to be accorded searches under a 
warrant, indicated that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant 
may be sustainable where without one it would fall”) (emphasis added) (loosely 
citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 
(1960)).6 Put plainly, according to the State and at least some of the federal case 
                                                
6 Defendants claim the citation in Vantresca to Jones is “loose[]” because page 
270 of the Jones decision does not indicate the evidentiary requirement in 
warrant cases was lower than in non-warrant cases, although Vantresca seems to 
say that it does. What page 270 in Jones does indicate is that warrants should not 
require more evidence, or “evidence of a more judicially competent or persuasive 
character”, than would support probable cause without a warrant, and that in 
close cases “it is most important that resort be had to a warrant, so that the 
evidence in the possession of the police may be weighed by an independent 
judicial officer”. Jones, 270. In other words, Jones wants to ensure that the police 
are not being disincentivised to seek a warrant. This is very different than saying 
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law, a search does not really need to be based on probable cause if a magistrate 
was willing to sign a warrant. 
The standard of review distinction between probable cause and the 
somewhat lower standard in warrant cases is ruinous to the explicit 
constitutional requirement that “no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause”. 
This Court should take this opportunity to “support, obey and defend… the 
Constitution of this State” by implementing a Utah standard of review that 
requires warrants to be supported by probable cause, period. UTAH CONST., art. 
IV, sec. 10. Even if this Court feels compelled to start its analysis by examining 
federal precedent, any such “precedent is certainly not controlling if 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are inconsistent or confused.” State v. 
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1996) (citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 
1196, 1205-06 (Utah 1995)). Federal precedent which interprets the explicit 
probable cause requirement and concludes there is a distinction between 
probable cause to support a warrantless search and something less than probable 
cause to support a warrant is inconsistent with the plain language of the 
constitution and confused. This Court should feel no obligation follow these cases 
or apply the federal standard of review when reviewing challenges based on 
Utah’s constitution. 
Defendants contend that federal efforts to encourage officers to follow the 
                                                                                                                                                       
probable cause for a warrant requires less evidence than non-warrant probable 
cause as Vantresca, and by extension the State, interprets it. 
 18 
constitutional demand for warrants, while arguably motivated by proper intent, 
have had the (perhaps) unintended consequence of diminishing and 
undermining the rights and standards explicitly provided by our constitution. 
Attempts to follow that federal path, toward diminished constitutional 
protection, is at odds with an oath to support, obey, and defend Utah’s 
constitution. Both as judges and as members of the bar we have sworn fidelity to 
the protection of these rights. It is in light of that duty that appellate counsel 
urges to the Court to consider this case as a whole, and specifically the applicable 
standard of proof. Defendants urge the Court to reject the standard of review 
propagated by the federal case law and apply this Court’s traditional mixed 
question standard, reviewing factual findings for clear error and the existence of 
probable cause for correctness. “[T]his two-standard approach takes into accout 
the relative functions of the trial and appellate courts while ensuring the 
consistent and uniform protection of a fundamental civil liberty.” State v. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 
1299 (Utah 1991)). 
B. Relevant Search and Seizure Law 
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized.” UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14. Despite the simplicity of the language used 
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in Utah’s constitution, there has been great confusion about what the right 
actually means, how it can be vindicated, and under what circumstances the 
government can infringe upon the right. 
Confusion about the breadth and depth of the federal counterpart in the 
Fourth Amendment has been propagated by years of contradictory case law. See 
State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985) (J. Zimmerman concurring) 
(describing the federal search and seizure law as a “labyrinth of rules built upon a 
series of contradictory and confusing rationalizations and distinctions”). It is in 
this context, the confused and contradictory Fourth Amendment case law, that 
the Defendants in this case come before this Court seeking a simple and 
straightforward application of Utah’s right, as a distinct and independent source 
of protection from government interference in the lives of the people of Utah.  
Based upon the trial court’s ruling and the State’s appeal, the question in 
this section is whether, according to Utah’s constitutional requirements, the 
magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude the warrant application 
established “probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.” UTAH 
CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14.7 Or, if the Court accepts Defendants’ invitation and 
applies the constitutionally sound standard of review, the only question is 
                                                
7 The question of whether the affidavit particularly described “the place to be 
searched, and the person or things to be seized” was not address in the court 
below and the record does not include any facts about whether the description in 
the affidavit is accurate. Therefore, Defendants limit their argument to the 
question of probable cause. 
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whether the trial court erred in concluding the affidavit didn’t establish probable 
cause. Defendants assert this Court can answer both questions in the negative. 
“Since our Constitution requires a showing of probable cause to support a 
search warrant… we hold, in line with the overwhelming weight of authority in 
the federal and state courts” that an affidavit is “not sufficient if it is made on 
information and belief, and is not corroborated or supported in any way.” Allen v. 
Lindbeck, 93 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1939). In Allen, a statute authorized the 
issuance of a warrant if the affiant “deposes that he has reason to believe and 
does believe the articles are wrongfully held or used.” Allen, 93 P.2d 920, 922. 
This Court concluded the statute was unconstitutional where it authorized a 
warrant, because probable cause was not “satisfied by an oath that one has reason 
to believe and does believe.” Allen, 922. 
Probable cause in Utah is more than suspicion, and it is more than 
reasonable belief. Probable cause is defined as an “apparent state of facts that a 
discreet and prudent man would be led to the belief that the accused, at the time 
of the application for the warrant, was in possession of the property.” Allen, 97 
Utah 471, 477 (quoting Cornelius on Search and Seizure, § 83). Defendants assert 
that the use of the word “was” in that sentence is crucially important. The term is 
not ‘might be’ or even ‘is likely’. The discreet and prudent person, based on the 
information he possesses, believes some set of facts ‘is’ the case.  
The distinction between the level of evidence the statute in Allen required 
and probable cause required by section 14 is an important distinction in this case. 
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Having reason to believe something means there are facts that one can point to 
supporting that belief. Thus, it is not just a hunch, but is based on reason. But 
reason to believe is not probable cause. Probable cause must be based upon 
enough evidence that a discreet and prudent person, a person who understood 
that taking a position on the matter will have serious consequences to the 
constitutional rights of another person, would conclude that a certain set of facts 
actually exist, that evidence of a crime actually will be found. The difference 
between reason to believe and probable cause is what distinguishes the 
magistrate’s reading of the affidavit from the trial court’s reading. 
There are no hard and fast rules delineating what amount of evidence 
creates probable cause. Probable cause must be based upon articulated 
particularized facts and circumstances. Mere conclusory statements will not 
suffice. The foundation of the existence of facts must be shown, the affiant must 
disclose the source of the facts, the reason he knows a fact to be true. If the 
affiant, the officer who swears to the facts alleged, does not know the facts based 
on his own experience, he must corroborate the allegations of his informants. See 
Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah App 1997); Salt Lake v. 
Bench, 2008 UT App 30, ¶14, 177 P.3d 655. With those considerations in mind, 
courts are instructed to consider the totality of the evidence and make a practical 
decision whether there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place. See State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986). 
Defendants assert that this Court will agree with the trial court’s thoughtful 
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decision and find the police failed to establish probable cause in the warrant 
application. 
C. Application 
1. Did the affidavit establish probable cause? 
 The information collected by the police came entirely from CI. And almost 
all the information provided by CI was conclusory, and unsupported by reference 
to CI’s knowledge or experience. For example, the State points to the statement 
from CI that “Mike” travels to California to obtain marijuana to sell it in “vacuum 
sealed” bags. State’s Brief at 16, see R.202, 062. But none of these facts are 
supported in the affidavit by reference to how CI knew these facts. Perhaps there 
is a possible inference from CI’s statement that he “has been in Mike’s home in 
the past and has made drug purchases from him.” R.062. But that statement 
gives no time frame, nor does it make any reference to any facts that could lead 
the magistrate to suspect CI’s claim was actually based on observation or 
information recent enough to support ongoing suspicion.  
 According to the affidavit, the CI did not say he saw drugs in vacuum 
sealed packages or give any facts to show how he knew that is how they were 
packaged, in fact the CI admitted to the police that he did not know where in the 
house the drugs were kept, suggesting the CI had not seen drugs in the house. 
R.062. The affidavit did not include evidence that the drugs CI delivered to the 
police were vacuum sealed or any other evidence to suggest CI’s production of 
drugs to the police corroborated his earlier statements. 
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 The affidavit did not include a claim that the CI observed Mike drive to 
California to purchase drugs, or any other facts from which anyone could 
conclude the CI had some personal knowledge about that fact. Nothing in the 
affidavit suggests the police had any information to show CI’s statements about 
his interactions with “Mike” were anything more than mere conclusory 
statements from CI. According to the affidavit, CI’s statements about “Mike” and 
his alleged distribution activities are nothing more than the “information and 
belief” at issue in Allen. 
 As the affidavit made clear, and as the trial court reasonably found, despite 
their efforts to confirm CI’s statements by checking records, the officers were 
“ultimately unsuccessful in corroborating any information provided by the CI.” 
R.202 (emphasis added). This factual finding, that the police did not corroborate 
any information provided by the CI, has not been challenged as clearly erroneous 
by the State on appeal,8 therefore this Court will not disturb those findings. See 
State v. Gurule, 2013 UT 58, ¶20, 321 P.3d 1039. The police did not know who 
“Mike” was, they did not know of his reputation or know of any prior drug 
involvements. And the police did not “attempt to corroborate any other innocent 
information provided by the informant.” R.202. The officers were satisfied to 
                                                
8 A search of the State’s brief reveals no mention of the “clearly erroneous” 
standard of review applied to a trial court’s factual findings. While the State’s 
brief does assert that the “controlled buy fully corroborated the CI’s report…”, 
nothing in the State’s brief suggests the State is actually challenging the factual 
findings of the trial court. 
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accept the CI’s word, which had not been and, apparently could not be, verified or 
confirmed in any way.  
 This blind trust in CI’s unsupported statements continued as the officers 
had CI arrange to buy drugs. After the police searched his person CI made a 
supervised phone call with “Mike”, but that supervision does not describe 
whether or how officers knew who, if anyone, CI was talking to. R.062. There is 
no mention of the number CI dialed, there is no mention making a recording. The 
officers’ supervision of the communication with “Mike” apparently consisted of 
listening to CI as he spoke into a cell phone and discussed purchasing “a 
predetermined amount of marijuana… for a predetermined amount of money” to 
occur at “Mike’s” residence, the same residence the police had not been able to 
connect to any person or confirm that anyone named Mike lived there. R.062. 
 The police then sent CI back into his unsearched car and followed him as 
he drove to the house in Provo and then went into the house. There is nothing in 
the affidavit suggesting the officers could see what was happening in the house, 
or whether or not CI was even met at the door by anyone, it just says he “arrived 
at the residence… and went inside.” R.062. “A short time passed and the CI was 
seen leaving the residence.” R.062. Other than CI’s presence at the listed address, 
the affidavit is devoid of any fact that would support or corroborate any of what 
CI later says happened in the house. After CI exited the house he got back into his 
unsearched car and drove back to meet up with the police. At that point CI did 
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not have the money on his person and did have drugs, which he said he bought 
from “Mike”. R.062. 
 The trial court considered three main factors in its totality of the 
circumstances review: CI’s reliability, the basis of his knowledge, and the degree 
to which CI’s assertions could be corroborated. R.204. In each instance the trial 
court found the facts presented were unpersuasive. The State, in its brief, now 
argues the opposite inference. State’s Brief at 16-17. However, the State’s 
arguments, about the reasons to believe CI, and his incentives to tell the truth, 
are all dependent upon the validity of the controlled buy. For example, the State 
argues that CI was a known defendant so he was “exposed to possible criminal 
and civil prosecution if the report was false.” State’s Brief at 16 (quoting State v. 
Royball, 2010 UT 34, ¶16, 232 P.3d 1016). If anything CI had said could have 
been verified, then perhaps this argument makes sense, but as demonstrated by 
the lack of any personal knowledge, CI’s statements to the police were more like 
the recitation of a rumor than a declaration of known facts. According to the 
affidavit, CI never told the police he knew or had personal experience of any of 
these facts, so in what way could they be false? 
 The State also argues that CI “risked losing the benefit of leniency in his 
criminal case if his report proved to be false.” State’s Brief at 16. This argument 
presumes the police had some way of determining whether “his report proved to 
be false”, and yet the facts demonstrated by the affidavit and found by the trial 
court showed the risk of “losing the benefit” is a fantasy.  Consider the situation 
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of the CI, he facing his own criminal case(s) and decided he would try to 
cooperate with the police in order to gain some favor. There was no risk in losing 
something he didn’t already have. Either it goes well so he gets the benefit of 
cooperation, or his information is not credible and doesn’t pan out and he is 
exactly where he was to begin with. Further, there was no risk to CI because his 
facts were vague and unchallengeable and the police allowed him to tell a story 
and then failed to corroborate any part of it. 
 What is most flawed about the State’s position regarding CI’s reliability is 
its characterization of the information CI provided. Nothing about the affidavit 
reflects that the allegations CI reported were “based on his first-hand” 
knowledge. State’s Brief at 17. Instead, most of the allegations were merely bare 
assertions of fact without explanation of how CI would know it. The details about 
“Mike’s” operations were very likely not based on personal knowledge, like the 
California detail, or the drugs being stored in some unknown location. The 
affidavit reveals the police, and the magistrate, had no reason to credit CI with 
any degree of reliability. As the trial court noted, these weaknesses were 
compounded when the police were unsuccessful in their attempts to 
“corroborat[e] any information provided by the CI.” R.202. 
 Finally, the State suggests CI’s admission that “he himself ‘has made drug 
purchases’ from Mike at his home.” State’s Brief at 17. The State relies upon State 
v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, ¶18, 104 P.3d 1265, to show that because CI admitted to 
committing a crime, that admission created “probable cause to search.” State’s 
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Brief at 17 (relying upon United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1971). But the problem with that position is that the admission here, 
that CI purchased marijuana from “Mike” at some unknown time, is far different 
than the admissions which created probable cause in Harris. There the Court 
conceded that “admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to 
contemporaneous or later accusations of another.” Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 584. In 
fact, it was only because the informant’s admissions in Harris was of ongoing and 
long term illegal activity, “that over a long period and currently he had been 
buying illicit liquor on certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that 
property and furnished probable cause.” Id. CI’s admission, to having bought 
marijuana an undisclosed number of times without any description of when, does 
not rise to the level of reliability mentioned in Harris. His vague admission 
would not subject himself to the threat of criminal liability and thus not make his 
statements more credible. 
 The State dismisses the trial court’s concerns about the lack of “control” 
because “an affidavit is judged on the adequacy of what it does contain” not what 
a “critic might say should have been added.” State’s Brief at 19 (quoting United 
States v. Kinson, 710 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2013)). The State thinks the trial 
court’s criticism of the “controlled” buy has to do with what affidavit does not 
contain; it thinks the court had doubts about probable cause because it wanted 
the officers to have done something other than what they did. That isn’t it. The 
Court had doubts about probable cause because of what the officers did do. The 
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officers saw CI drive up in his car without any idea what was in his car. The 
officers allowed CI get back into his car, still having no idea what was in his car. 
The officers allowed CI to spend time in the car, alone. This is not a matter of the 
trial court imagining and demanding the perfect scenario, it is recognizing how 
the facts recited by the officers undermine a reasonable belief that what CI said 
happened was the truth. 
 When all these factors are considered, CI’s lack of credibility, the officer’s 
failure to corroborate any of his claims, and the complete lack of control over the 
buy, the trial court’s conclusion that the affidavit did not establish probable cause 
is correct. Compare State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993). This Court 
should affirm the trial court’s decision. 
2. Did the magistrate have a substantial basis to conclude the 
affidavit established probable cause? 
 As argued above, Defendants contend that the “substantial basis” standard 
of review is unconstitutional because it reduces the level of evidence needed to 
support a warrant, and that this Court should apply a correctness review on the 
question of whether the affidavit established probable cause. However, if the 
Court is content to apply the federal standard of review, Defendants maintain, for 
all the reasons explained above, that the magistrate would not have had a 
substantial basis to conclude there was probable cause evidence of a crime would 
be found in the house. 
 To the extent that “a substantial basis” for probable cause is a lower 
standard than probable cause there are federal cases applying this standard 
 29 
which demonstrate the lack of substantial basis. In addition to the concerns 
argued above, the magistrate would not have had a substantial basis to concluded 
probable cause existed because the affidavit contained significant errors that 
called into question the officer’s own credibility. For example, the officer 
acknowledges he has only recently met CI “in the past 72 hours”. R.062. In the 
next paragraph he claims “[t]he CI has provided creditable information and has 
not said anything that would prove false or misleading. The information the CI 
has given has been investigated and proved credible.” R.062.  
 One might ask, what information has been investigated and proved 
credible? Obviously, it was not the fact that “Mike” lived at the address, because 
officers had “attempted through every avenue to try and identify Mike”, including 
“[r]ecords checks on the residence, registrations of vehicles, and requesting 
information from other agencies”, all of which failed to corroborate CI’s claims. 
R.063. It was not the information CI provided about prior drug buys from 
“Mike”, nor was it the fact that “Mike” packages his products in vacuum sealed 
bags. In fact, the only fact that CI provided to the officers that was verified in any 
way was the claim that, on the day of the buy, CI bought marijuana from this 
unknown person at the house and then CI presented marijuana to the officers. 
But that corroboration was significantly undermined by the lack of control. 
Obviously, the drugs could have come from CI, the person “familiar with drug 
distribution and drug practices” who was currently seeking “leniency for pending 
charges”. R.062. 
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 The magistrate would not have had a substantial basis to believe anything at 
all would be found at that house, that “Mike” was a real person, or that anyone, 
other than CI, had access to marijuana. Even under the lower “substantial basis” 
standard of review, this Court should affirm the trial court’s decision by finding 
the warrant was improperly issued by the magistrate. 
II. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION REQUIRES EXCLUSION OF 
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE  
A. Larocco, Sims, Thompson, Debooy 
 The State acknowledges Larocco, Thompson, Sims, and Debooy as cases in 
which this Court has recognized the independent exclusionary rule for violations 
of article I, section 14. State’s Brief at 22-24. And whatever criticism may be made 
about the underlying reasoning of any or all of those cases, the fact of the matter 
cannot be doubted, the current state of the law in Utah is that “exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of 
article I, section 14.” State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (quoting State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)). As it stands, the trial court was correct 
when it concluded it did not have “authority to depart from binding precedent.” 
R.185. Defendants assert that this precedent is still binding, on every court in this 
state, unless and until this Court reverses these former decisions. 
B. This Court should not overturn its precedent 
1. Stare decisis 
 “Stare decisis ‘is a cornerstone of Anglo-American jurisprudence’ because it 
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‘is crucial to the predictability of the law and fairness of adjudication.’” Eldridge, 
2015 UT 21, ¶21 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)). 
Thus, this Court will not overturn its own precedents “lightly”; instead it will only 
do so if the precedent is not considered “weighty” because it was not (1) based on 
persuasive authority and reasoning, and is not (2) firmly established in the law 
since it was handed down. Eldridge, 2015 UT 21, ¶22. Defendants now assert that 
this Court should not overrule the above cited precedent establishing a state 
exclusionary rule arising from article I, section 14. Defendants assert the Utah 
exclusionary rule was based upon sound authority and reasoning and is firmly 
established in Utah’s constitutional case law. 
 There can be little doubt that this Court’s decision, recognizing the state 
exclusionary rule, in Larocco, and repeated in Sims and Thompson, has been the 
subject of debate and criticism.9 But that criticism has not resulted in overturning 
the precedent. Utah constitutional law, as it currently stands, provides that 
“[e]xclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police 
violations of article I, section 14.” Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472 (and repeated 
verbatim by four justices in State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 419). 
 Because of that status, in order to overturn these cases and reverse course 
away from the constitutional requirement of exclusion, this Court must not only 
find that the prior precedent is lightweight enough to be overturned, but it must 
also find that it should be overturned, that some alternative to exclusion is a more 
                                                
9 See State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶¶27-58 (J. Lee, concurring). 
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sound and constitutionally viable path. Defendants assert that the Larocco/ 
Thompson precedent is weighty enough to withstand scrutiny, and if not, given 
the opportunity to determine the scope of our constitutional protection, this 
Court should still reach the same result. As the trial court put it, “[e]ven if it could 
disregard precedent and strike out on its own, this Court [should] for the reasons 
stated below leave the exclusionary rule firmly ensconced in state search and 
seizure jurisprudence.” R.185-86. 
 The State claims the Thompson decision is “not the most weighty of 
precedents” because it “did not [analyze]10 the text or history of Article I, § 14, 
and failed to acknowledge, much less explain why it was departing from, this 
Court’s long-standing precedent rejecting a state exclusionary rule for violations 
of Article I, § 14.” State’s Brief at 23. Defendants’ reading of Thompson is 
different. Thompson relied upon the reasoning of Larocco to recognize the 
exclusionary rule of section 14, and by extension, it relied upon Larocco’s 
explanation. See Thompson, 419. The decision in Larocco certainly did examine 
the text of section 14, and considered how the two clauses related to each other 
and how different courts at different times have applied different approaches. 
Larocco, 467. Defendants defend this Court’s holding in Thompson, and the 
plurality’s reasoning in Larocco, as well reasoned, weighty, and capable of 
supporting the conclusion that violations of section 14 are subject to exclusion of 
                                                
10 There appears to be a typographical error in this sentence of the State’s Brief. 
Without wanting to alter the meaning of the State’s argument, appellant counsel 
inserted the term “analyze” to make sense of the sentence. 
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illegally obtained evidence. 
 The interesting thing about the State’s position about Thompson is that it 
begs the question, did “this Court’s long-standing precedent rejecting a state 
exclusionary rule” analyze the text or history of Article I? In other words, this 
long-standing precedent, State v. Aime, when it rejected the idea of exclusion, did 
the Court consider the 24 years of precedent the text of section 14 had 
established, did it analyze the text of the constitution, did it consider the original 
intent of the drafters? The State’s attempt to criticize the holding in Thompson as 
not being weighty enough ignores the absolute dearth of textual analysis or 
reasoning in Aime.  
 While the decision in Aime does devote several pages citing decisions from 
other jurisdictions, those citations focus primarily on the principle that courts 
“will not take notice of the manner in which a witness has possessed himself of 
papers or other chattles” because to do so “would halt the orderly progress of a 
cause in the consideration of an incidental question”. Aime, 220 P. 703, 706 
(citing Banks v. State, 93 So. 293 (Ala. 1921). The text of section 14 is nowhere to 
be found in the Aime decision, nor is there any mention of what, if any, remedy 
the constitutional framers intended section 14 to create. 
 This criticism demonstrates the real crux of the problem with earlyUtah 
constitutional law in general. This Court’s decisions have not always met the high 
standard its recent case law has established. Defendants encourage the Court to 
take this opportunity, to leave no stone unturned and issue a decision that will 
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clarify the meaning of section 14 and the justifications upon which it depends. 
2. The text of the Utah Constitution supports exclusion 
 If the Court is inclined to find that the precedent of Larocco, Sims, 
Thompson, and Debooy should not be followed as a matter of stare decisis, and 
that the doctrine of an independent state exclusionary rule should be 
reconsidered, Defendants believe that this Court’s analysis of section 14 should 
reestablish exclusion as the necessary and proper remedy for violations of Utah’s 
search and seizure protections. 
 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized.” UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14. For the purposes of this brief Defendants 
will divide section 14 into two main sections, the security section, and the 
probable cause section. Neither of those sections explicitly require the Court to 
exclude evidence obtained from a violation of the rights. However, Defendants 
contend that the meaning of the text, the meaning of the rights, implies exclusion 
as fundamental to the right. 
 First, the probable cause section. The plain text requires that no warrant 
shall issue without probable cause. There is no room for debate, warrants shall 
not issue without probable cause. But what if a warrant does issue without 
probable cause? It happens, it happened in this case. Then what? The State 
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argues that the text of section 14 “does not impose or otherwise contemplate an 
exclusionary remedy.” According to the State, because the text does not explicitly 
create a “rule of evidence” making illegally obtained evidence inadmissible, there 
is not textual support for exclusion. State’s Brief at 33-34 (citing Aime, 220 P. at 
707). Put simply, from the State’s perspective, because the language of section 14 
does not use the words suppression or exclusion there is no way such a remedy is 
required by the constitution. Defendants contend that exclusion is not the 
equivalent of a rule of evidence and that the language of the constitution does not 
need be explicit for exclusion to be constitutionally required.  
 Exclusion is not about admissibility; it is not as though illegally obtained 
evidence is being excluded because the Court has misgivings about the evidence’s 
reliability, as if it were a concern about foundation, reliability, or authentication. 
Admissibility and the rules of evidence have as their aim the admission of reliable 
and competent evidence, so as to get as near to the truth as possible. Illegally 
obtained evidence may be very reliable. In many cases, evidence discovered by 
violating the constitution may be the most reliable source of evidence about what 
the defendant is accused of doing. Reliability has no bearing on the question of 
whether the government should be allowed to use it as evidence at trial. As 
unpleasant as it may sound, exclusion is not about the truth, exclusion is about 
the fundamental right of individuals to security in their homes, in the privacy of 
their own lives, past, present, and future. Reliable or not, exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence is about the fundamental and invaluable limits on the powers 
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of the government. Exclusion of evidence is about the fundamental value in 
maintaining a government which obeys its own laws.11  
 Exclusion does not make evidence merely inadmissible, it makes it utterly 
unavailable to the state. Exclusion removes from the government the power to 
use the fruits of its own crimes in any way, and restores to the individual the 
security guaranteed by the constitution, curing the past harm as well as 
protecting against present and future violations. Exclusion is about undoing the 
government’s wrongs, cleaning the government’s hands, and re-securing an 
individual’s person and property. 
 Presumably, according to the State’s logic, because section 14 does not 
explicitly describe the process of exclsuion, the rights in section 14 are merely 
lofty goals for the government to aspire to, that have no constitutional means of 
enforcement. See State’s Brief at 33. The State’s position presumes that the 
constitutional framers intentionally designed these constitutional rights to be 
impotent, and without any remedy. Defendants implore the Court to reject this 
logic as destructive to the fundamental rights we, as a constitutionally based 
society, hold most sacred.  
 Instead, Defendants propose the alternative logic of ‘where there is a right, 
there is a remedy.’12 Defendants propose that the constitutional framers intended 
                                                
11 See State v. Buckley, 258 P. 1030 (Wash. 1927) (“it is beneath the dignity of the 
state, and contrary to public policy, for the state to use for its own profit evidence 
that has been obtained in violation of the law.” 
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the rights recognized in section 14 to be self-executing. Security in one’s home 
and person and property is its own remedy, the right is the remedy. The right to 
security and the remedy of exclusion of evidence in a criminal case are 
synonymous. Exclusion ‘breathes life’ into the right to security. See Brierley v. 
Layton City, 2016 UT 46, ¶20. Exclusion is the vindication or the restoration of 
the right to security. When the government breaks the law, and violates one’s 
right to security in one’s home, exclusion is at least a partial restoration of that 
security.  
 The State would have the Court adopt the faulty reasoning in Leon that 
pretends that once the police have violated a person’s rights by unlawfully 
entering and searching his home, or seizing himself or his property, the damage 
is done, or “fully accomplished”, and exclusion “is neither intended nor able to 
cure the invasion of the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.” State’s 
Brief at 43 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906). This argument fails to comprehend the 
scope of the right to security, and the potential for ongoing violations created by 
the government’s use of illegal evidence. 
 Defendants assert that right to security enshrined in section 14 does not 
evaporate once the government violates it. The fact that the government violated 
Defendants’ rights to be secure in their home, and to the privacy enjoyed therein, 
                                                                                                                                                       
12 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) (“The very essence of civil 
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
the laws, whenever he receives an injury… Blackstone states [that]… ‘it is a 
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.’”). 
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on August 28, 2012 does not forever extinguish those rights. Michael Rowan and 
Rebecca George are still entitled to security in their home and the privacy they 
had there, even today, even years after the government violated those rights. At 
this very moment, by virtue of section 14 Defendants maintain the right to be 
secure from unreasonable searches of their home, past, present, and future. That 
includes the right in the future to be secure from the government’s past illegal 
conduct. At this moment Defendants maintain the right to demand security in 
their home, and to demand that judicial officers not allow the government to 
expose private details from their home. Security means the government cannot 
continue to violate one’s rights long after the police drive away from the house by 
using evidence derived from illegal conduct. 
 Exclusion puts the Defendants, whose security has been violated, back into 
the legal standing they enjoyed before the government destroyed the sanctity and 
security of their home. Exclusion vindicates the ongoing right to privacy, to 
security in the home, to security in the privacy of the contents and activities in the 
home. And while exclusion may not perfectly restore a person to his pre-violation 
status, while his door may still be smashed-in and his property flung from 
drawers, exclusion does restore the legal circumstances by removing the evidence 
collected from the violation from the government’s use, where it would have been 
if the violation had not occurred. While exclusion does not perfectly replace every 
item disturbed or confiscated by illegal government conduct, it at least returns a 
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defendant to same security status, where the government is not allowed 
continued access to use the secure details of his private life against him. 
 Without exclusion, Defendants’ right to security and privacy is repeatedly 
violated, over and over, as the details of their private lives are exposed to 
attorneys and clerks, and journalists to judges and jurors, and to the public at 
large. Without exclusion, Defendants’ right to security in the past, present, and 
future is permanently denied. Exclusion not only specifically remedies the prior 
illegal conduct (by attempting to repair the harm done to defendant and 
removing the ill-gotten advantage gained by the government) but it also stops the 
government’s ongoing violation by ending the government’s access to and use of 
a defendant’s person or property. In this way exclusion gives meaning to the 
right;13 without exclusion Defendants’ right to security is repeatedly and endlessly 
violated. Without the remedy of exclusion, the substantive right to security in 
one’s own home is merely aspirational, merely a suggestion. This Court should 
not accept the State’s position that language of our constitutional right, the right 
to be secure from illegal search and seizure, to be a right without any real life 
meaning or function. 
 When the framers of the Utah Constitution wrote section 14, they would 
have understood that the right to be secure from unreasonable searches was an 
actual right, not merely an empty aspirational goal for the government to do its 
                                                
13 See Douglas Laycock, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (4th ed. 2010) 
("Remedies give meaning to obligations imposed by the rest of the substantive 
law… [Remedies are] the means by which legal obligations are given effect."). 
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best to comply with, except when it didn’t suit its investigative purposes. The 
Utah framers would have understood that security in one’s home and personal 
effects was an ongoing right and did not end after the government committed a 
violation. In order to give meaning to those real and ongoing rights, the framers 
would have understood there must be a way to protect and enforce that right, into 
the future, especially for those whose rights had been violated. The framers, in 
light of Boyd (see infra), would have imbued the language of section 14 with an 
understanding that security in one’s home includes preventing the government 
from continued intrusion by using illegally obtained evidence at a trial. The 
framers would have understood that exclusion is part and parcel of the right of 
the people to be secure from government crimes. 
3. The historical context supports exclusion  
 The historical context of 1890’s search and seizure law supports the 
conclusion that the framers of the Utah constitution intended section 14 to 
require exclusion of evidence. 
 The Utah Constitution of 1895 was the last in a long line of attempts by the 
Territory of Utah/Deseret to become a state. Beginning as early as 184914 the 
settlers assembled in constitutional conventions and repeatedly attempted to 
establish a constitution. While those efforts resulted in numerous iterations of a 
proposed constitution, none of these proposals were accepted by the United 
States. It wasn’t until after the Congress passed the Enabling Act in 1894 that 
                                                
14 See Dale Morgan, State of Deseret, Utah Historical Quarterly, 8 (1940), page 
85. 
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Utah had any chance of becoming a state. The final 1895 version of the Utah 
Constitution, including the Declaration of Rights of article I, had been evolving 
for forty-five years, with small changes to structure and content, usually 
borrowing portions from the federal and other state constitutions, including 
those of recently added sister states.15 “The convention borrowed heavily from 
earlier Utah constitutions and other state constitutions, particularly those of 
Nevada, Washington, Illinois, and New York and retained the antigovernment 
philosophy which marked Utah’s Constitutions of 1872, 1882, and 1887.” John 
Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government -- The History of Utah’s 
Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REV. 311, 323. 
 “The development of Utah constitutional thought thus shows familiarity 
with constitutional development on other states, and demonstrates that Utah, 
despite her experiments in marriage and economic relationships, was not ready 
to depart from the traditional forms of American government”. HICKMAN, at 74. 
This familiarity of constitutional development would have included the framers 
being familiar the United States Supreme Court’s decisions. 
4. Boyd v. United States 
 In 1895, when the framers of Utah’s constitution were basing section 14 
upon the text and meaning of the Fourth Amendment, exclusion was part of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
                                                
15 See MARTIN HICKMAN, Utah Constitutional Law, 40-78 (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation available at the University of Utah J. Williard Marriott Library and 
the Brigham Young University Harold B. Lee Library). 
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 Right in the middle of Utah’s constitutional evolution, in 1886, the United 
States Supreme Court considered the case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), where the defendant claimed an 1874 law 
requiring him to produce his private books and papers in a case against him 
violated the Fourth Amendment. At trial he objected to the government requiring 
him to provide this evidence but his argument failed and he lost the trial based 
upon that evidence. In its opinion, the Supreme Court recalled the “recent history 
of the controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England” related 
to the issuance of writs of assistance allowing the authorities to search for 
evidence of smuggled goods. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25. The Court concluded 
that application of the law constituted an illegal search or seizure and that the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment prevented the federal government from forcing a 
person to produce evidence in this manner. Most importantly for the purposes of 
this case, the Court ordered that the “judgment of the Circuit Court should be 
reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to award a new trial.” Boyd, 
116 U.S. 616, 638.  
 In other words, the illegal search and seizure of property and the use of the 
illegally obtained evidence at trial violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court 
ordered a new trial which would have to proceed without the use of the illegally 
seized evidence because “its admission in evidence by the court, [was] erroneous 
and unconstitutional proceedings.” Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 638. Without using the 
terms suppression or exclusion, the United States Supreme Court, in 1886, ruled 
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that evidence obtained in violation the Fourth Amendment must not be used in a 
criminal trial. In 1886, and relevantly in 1895, the language of the Fourth 
Amendment meant that search and seizure violations resulted in exclusion. This 
is the meaning of language of the federal constitution that the Utah framers 
would have been looking to. 
 Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 
1229 (Utah 1996) wrote a thoughtful statement about how the framers of the 
Utah Constitution must have felt about the rights they were enshrining in article 
I. Because the federal Bill of Rights was not incorporated into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment until much later, “the framers of the Utah 
Constitution… viewed their own state constitutional provisions as the sole source 
of constitutional protection for those individual liberties enshrined” in our state 
declaration of rights. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1240 (J. Stewart, concurring in the 
result). Those framers would not have had any reason to expect that the citizens 
of Utah would be protected from state actors by the Fourth Amendment or by the 
exclusionary rule announced in Boyd. Because of that lack of protection, these 
constitutional authors wanted to protect the citizens of Utah from the same kinds 
of state government overreach that the Fourth Amendment provided from the 
federal government. If the framers of the Utah Constitution only wanted the 
citizens of Utah to be protected from the federal government and not from the 
action of state authorities, there would have been no need to enact article I, 
section 14, no need to repeat the language that had been interpreted to require 
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exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. But those framers enacted section 14 
demonstrating an obvious desire to protect the people of Utah from the actions of 
the state government.  
 This protection would have been made in light of the holding in Boyd, and 
the then existing exclusionary function of the language of the Fourth 
Amendment. It would have been made considering the United State Supreme 
Court’s rejection of the earlier longstanding proposition that illegally seized 
evidence could still be admitted. Instead, understanding that the Fourth 
Amendment protected Boyd from the use of illegally obtained evidence by US 
Marshalls at his trial, the Utah framers used nearly identical language to protect 
Utahans from state actors using illegally obtained evidence in state cases.  
 The State points to Justice Lee’s concurring opinion in Walker, 2011 UT 
53, ¶49, where he points out that “no appellate court in any state had excluded 
unlawfully obtained evidence under its constitution” in 1895. State’s Brief at 37, 
fn.4. Presumably this suggests that other states did not believe their constitutions 
required exclusion, and therefore neither would have the Utah framers. But this 
fact means very little in context because Boyd, and its recognition of exclusion as 
a constitutionally mandated remedy, was issued in 1886, long after most states 
had adopted their constitutions with a pre-Boyd understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment. The framers of those earlier state constitutions would arguably not 
have understood their own constitutions, though similar to the federal 
constitution, to require exclusion because, at the time they were ratified, 
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exclusion under the Fourth Amendment was not yet recognized. But in 1895, nine 
years after Boyd, Utah’s constitutional framers who looked to the language of the 
Fourth Amendment and its recognized meaning at the time would have 
understood that exclusion was part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s right 
against illegal search and seizure. The fact that earlier states had not interpreted 
their own constitutions, ratified before Boyd, to require exclusion should not 
mean Utah’s framers would have had a similar intent. 
 Defendants dispute the State’s position that exclusion as a constitutional 
requirement would have been foreign to the drafters of the Utah Constitution. 
Based on the historical setting and the state of the Fourth Amendment case law 
after Boyd in 1889, exclusion was the constitutionally required remedy for 
violations of search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Utah’s drafters 
would have been aware of the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment. The framers would have understood that, according to 
Boyd, if evidence had been illegally obtained any judgment based on that 
evidence was illegitimate and should result in reversal and a new trial without the 
illegal evidence.  
“It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes essence of the offence; but it is the invasion 
of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and 
private property,… it is the invasion of this sacred right which 
underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden’s Judgment. 
Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are 
 46 
circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory 
extortion of a man’s… private papers to be used as evidence to convict 
him of crime… is within the condemnation of that judgment.”  
Boyd, 630. The framers would have understood the that the similar 
language they used in section 14 would have had the same meaning. 
 Defendants assert that this Court should not overturn the precedent of 
Larocco and Thompson. The Court should reaffirm the authority of the Utah 
Constitution to protect our citizens from the unreasonable and unwarranted 
intrusions of an at times overzealous government, independent of the 
inconsistent and unpredictable federal exclusionary rule. This Court should take 
an active role in supporting, obeying, and defending the rights of Utahans as it 
interprets the meaning of our own founding document. Defendants asks the 
Court to contemplate what security from unreasonable search and seizure means 
it if a violation has no consequence. Defendants ask the Court to consider 
whether the use of illegally obtained evidence would not be itself another 
violation of the right to be secure in one’s home, papers, and effects. Does one 
lose the right of security in these places and property for ever after once the 
government commits the initial violation? Defendants ask the Court to defend 
our security from government intrusion, even after the intrusion occurs. 
Defendants assert that exclusion of evidence is not a mere a judicial remedy 
tacked on the back end to try to deter future violations. Exclusion is a 
continuation of the right to security; exclusion is security from unlawful state 
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action after a violation has occurred. The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, homes, and property includes the right to prevent the government from 
using illegally obtained evidence.  
III. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE A GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION TO UTAH’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
A. Prior precedent implicitly shows there is no good faith 
exception to Utah’s exclusionary rule 
 This Court has previously stated that it has yet to decide whether the state 
exclusionary rule is subject to a good faith exception. “We leave for another day 
the issue of whether to apply in appropriate circumstances a good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule to article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.” 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 420. However, when faced with the opportunity to 
recognize a good faith exception the Court did not do so. 
 In State v. Debooy, 2000 UT 546, ¶1, the defendant was convicted of drug 
possession charges and appealed his case challenging the constitutionality of a 
checkpoint where the police discovered evidence of crimes. The police filed an 
application with a magistrate requesting authorization to conduct an 
“administrative highway checkpoint” with the intent to inspect or detect traffic 
and safety related violations, and “[o]ther alcohol and/or controlled substance 
violations.” Debooy, ¶2. The magistrate authorized the checkpoint and the 
defendant was investigated when he was stopped. Id, ¶¶3-4. While stopped at the 
checkpoint the officers asked consent to search, received it, and discovered 
“contraband in a backpack in the trunk.” Id., ¶4. 
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 On appeal this Court found that the section 14 and the Fourth Amendment 
have not “always been interpreted the same way” and that this Court “will not 
hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction where doing so will 
more appropriately protect the rights of this state’s citizens.” Id., ¶12. The Court 
considered federal cases examining checkpoints but “solely for their persuasive 
value, and [did] not regard them as binding for purposes of state law.” Id, ¶19. 
The Court recognized the interest section 14 has in protecting against practices 
similar to general warrants where officers were given authority to search without 
specified probable cause. Id., at ¶26. 
 Eventually the Court concluded that the police checkpoint violated section 
14 prohibition that against unreasonable searches and seizures in section 14. Id., 
¶33. Implicitly, the Court found that the police action was not protected by their 
good faith reliance upon the magistrate’s authorization. Presumably, if a good 
faith exception were to exist under Utah’s Constitution, Debooy would have been 
an opportunity to recognize and apply it.  
 Defendants assert that the erroneous judicial authorization of an 
administrative checkpoint that is later executed by the police in good faith is 
analogous to the issuance of a warrant that lacks probable cause that is later 
executed in good faith by the police. In both instances the constitutional error is 
caused by a judicial officer authorizing police action. In both instances the police 
have done nothing wrong. And in both instances the defendant’s right to be 
secure from unreasonable search or seizure and from warrants without probable 
 49 
cause is violated.  Debooy demonstrates that section 14 is concerned more about 
protecting an individual’s right than it is about punishing the person or 
government agency responsible for the violation of the right. Because this Court 
did not recognize a good faith exception to section 14 in Debooy when it could 
have, the Court should not recognize one here. 
B. A good faith exception is inconsistent with the text of Utah’s 
Constitution 
 The text of section 14 requires that “no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause”. UTAH CONST., ART. I, SECT. 14. If the Court were to adopt a good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule it would allow the government use 
warrants issued without probable cause, in direct defiance of the language of 
section 14. A good faith exception would lower the explicit constitutional 
requirement of probable cause to some other ‘standard’. What could be more 
offensive to the explicit probable cause standard than to judicially acknowledge 
the validity of warrants executed without probable cause? As argued in the 
standard of proof argument above, the creation of a good faith exception defies 
the plain text of section 14 and replaces it. The State would have the Court 
effectively amend section 14 as follows: Warrants may issue without probable 
cause so long as law enforcement executes the warrant in good faith. This 
perversion of one of the most basic tenants of constitutional law should not be 
adopted. This Court should defend the language of section 14 and firmly establish 
that warrants are invalid if they are not supported by probable cause and when 
the government executes an invalid warrant it has violated section 14. 
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C. A good faith exception is inconsistent with the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule 
 The State would have the Court adopt the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, (1974) 
and find that the only purpose of an exclusionary rule is to deter future 
constitutional violations by law enforcement. See State’s Brief at 42-43. But such 
a conclusion would be to neuter the constitution and ignore the historical 
meaning of exclusion. 
 Defendants ask the Court to reject Calandria and the relatively modern 
view that exclusion is merely a judicial remedy, rather than constitutionally 
required. “[T]he Leon holding could not have been reached but for the [U.S.] 
Supreme Court’s narrow justification for the exclusionary rule”, that was 
accomplished by rewriting history and limiting the purpose of the rule to only 
deterring future unlawful police conduct. State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671 
(Idaho 1992) (referring to Calandra). Prior to the rewriting of history, the United 
States Supreme Court stated in many cases that there were several purposes of 
the exclusionary rule, including to protect a person's Fourth Amendment 
guarantees by deterring lawless conduct by police officers and to close the 
courthouse doors "to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained." Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).16  
                                                
16 See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 
(1975) (the dual considerations of deterrence and judicial integrity are 
commonplace purposes of the exclusionary rule); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12-13, 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (The exclusionary rule serves to deter 
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 Defendants now assert, and many jurisdictions have agreed, that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s “revisionist history of the exclusionary rule” is inaccurate and 
untrue to the spirit and previously acknowledged purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusion. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660, 671. That same limited view of 
article I, section 14 proposed by the State should not be adopted in Utah. Rather, 
unlike the current federal majority vision of the federal exclusionary rule, Utah’s 
exclusionary rule has multiple purposes and justifications beyond deterrence of 
future police conduct and creating a good faith exception would defeat those 
other purposes and justifications. 
 The exclusionary rule is a vindication of individual constitutional rights. As 
explained in Weeks, the prosecution’s use of illegally seized evidence involved “a 
denial of the constitutional rights of the accused.” Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 393, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). That would have been similar to 
the purpose for exclusion in Boyd, where the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed “a 
very grave question of constitutional law, involving the personal security, and 
privileges and immunities of the citizen”. Boyd, 618. 
 That same purpose was recognized in New Jersey when its supreme court 
rejected the Leon exception too. The exclusionary “rule also serves as the 
indispensable mechanism for vindicating the constitutional right to be free from 
                                                                                                                                                       
police misconduct and preserve judicial integrity, to prevent the courts from 
being “made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by 
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions”); Elkins 
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (The 
exclusionary rule also serves “the imperative of judicial integrity.”). 
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unreasonable searches.” State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (N.J. 1987). In 
New Mexico the supreme court’s finding of an independent exclusionary rule did 
not focus “on deterrence or judicial integrity, nor do we propose a judicial 
remedy; instead, our focus is to effectuate in the pending case the constitutional 
right of the accused to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. 
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (N.M. 1993).  
 With these additional purposes of the exclusionary rule firmly established, 
based in case law, history, and logic, there is no reason to create a good faith 
exception. The State’s attempt to do so cannot be said to come from any 
reverence to the constitution, but instead from a desire to minimize and dilute 
the rights of the people and enlarge power of the government. Given this Court’s 
unique responsibility to the Utah Constitution and the rights of the people of 
Utah, this Court should view the State’s request very skeptically. 
 Finally, the history of Utah’s settlers and their experiences with local and 
federal government agents in the years immediately preceding 1895 should be 
considered when examining what the language of section 14 means. There can be 
little doubt that many of the framers were intimately familiar with government 
abuses of search and seizure, including the use of general or unsupported 
warrants.17 These abuses give critical insight into why the framers would not want 
to insulate from review the issuance of an illegal warrant. 
                                                
17 See Tracey Panek, Search and Seizure in Utah: Recounting the Antipolygamy 
Raids, Utah Historical Quarterly, Fall 1994, 319-334. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
 Because the trial court correctly concluded the affidavit failed to support 
probable cause, or because the magistrate did not have a substantial basis to find 
probable cause, this court should affirm the granting of Defendant’s motion to 
dismiss. This Court should not reverse its cases recognizing the state exclusionary 
rule nor create a good faith exception thereto. This Court should affirm. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of November, 2016. 
 
       ________________________ 
       Douglas Thompson 
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oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
History
Const. 1896.
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Notice
 Part 1 of 11. You are viewing a very large document that has been divided into parts.
Unreasonable searches and seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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